Africa holds vast critical minerals but stays trapped in debt. As South Africa hosts the G20 Summit, leaders demand a new mineral deal on their own terms.
When G20 leaders gather in Johannesburg this weekend, Africa will not just host the summit – it will test a new bargaining chip: its critical minerals.
From cobalt in the Democratic Republic of Congo to manganese in South Africa and Ghana, the continent controls a huge share of the metals that power electric cars, batteries and solar plants. Sub-Saharan Africa holds about 30% of proven global critical mineral reserves, according to the IMF, yet remains locked in costly debt and low-value exports.
UN trade agency UNCTAD estimates that Africa is home to roughly 55% of the world’s cobalt, almost 48% of manganese and around 22% of natural graphite reserves – all essential for the energy transition.
Demand for these minerals is set to soar, with the International Energy Agency projecting that overall critical mineral demand may need to triple by 2030 and quadruple by 2040 to keep net-zero goals in sight.
African policymakers see this summit, the first G20 held on the continent, as a rare chance to convert geological abundance into political leverage – and to push the world’s biggest economies to link mineral access to fairer debt, investment and value-addition deals.
South Africa, which holds the rotating G20 presidency, has already flagged critical minerals as a flagship theme, pitching them as an engine of African growth if processed at home rather than exported in raw form.
Minerals as leverage in a broken debt system
The timing is not accidental. Africa’s external public debt passed the $1 trillion mark in 2023, and debt-servicing costs have almost tripled since 2010. Interest payments alone now consume roughly 17% of government revenues on average, one study for the G20 presidency estimates – the highest burden of any major region.
Yet African debt is not unusually large by global standards: average public debt is projected at about 64% of GDP in 2025, compared with more than 100% in the G7. What makes it unsustainable is the cost of borrowing, driven by volatile currencies, “Africa premiums” in credit ratings and the slow, creditor-driven design of the G20’s own Common Framework for debt restructuring. Critics note that, so far, the framework has reduced high-risk debt by only about 7%, with only a handful of African countries completing deals.
This is why African leaders increasingly talk about a “minerals-for-fiscal-space” bargain. The African Development Bank has floated an African Units of Account proposal, a non-circulating currency backed by critical mineral reserves to stabilise financing for green projects and reduce currency risk.
The mechanism is complex and controversial, but it signals how far conversations have shifted: minerals are no longer just export commodities, they are collateral and bargaining chips.
At the same time, governments are tightening control over key supply chains. The Democratic Republic of Congo, which provides more than 70% of global cobalt output and roughly half of proven reserves, has introduced export quotas after a temporary ban, limiting shipments well below recent production in a bid to stabilise prices and push companies toward local processing.
Observers see a broader pattern. From Zimbabwe’s restrictions on unprocessed lithium to Namibia’s moves on rare earths, African producers are testing forms of “resource nationalism 2.0” – not the outright expropriation of the 1970s, but a recalibration of contracts, taxes and export rules to secure more value at home.
For creditors and manufacturers in G20 capitals, the message is clear: if you want secure access to the minerals that underpin your green transition, you may need to help fix Africa’s debt and invest in its refineries and factories, not just its pits.
African institutions are trying to provide a common script. The African Mining Vision already called for mining to be integrated into industrial and trade policy; it is now being reinforced by the African Union’s Africa’s Green Minerals Strategy, which advocates building battery, refining and recycling value chains on the continent.
In Johannesburg, negotiators from the African Union and major producers like South Africa, DRC and Zambia are expected to press for three linked commitments from G20 partners:
* predictable, long-term offtake contracts tied to local processing;
* concessional or blended finance for infrastructure and green energy in mining regions;
* and a reworked debt architecture that offers automatic payment standstills in shocks and faster restructurings.
“It is no longer acceptable for Africa to ship out ore and import batteries while paying double-digit yields on our bonds,” one senior African finance official said ahead of the summit. “Our minerals must buy us fiscal space and factories, not just foreign dividends.”
Whether that vision gains traction will depend on how far G20 members are prepared to go beyond communiqués. China already dominates much of the refining of cobalt, graphite and rare earths, processing more than 70% of many key minerals. Western governments, anxious about concentration risk and supply-chain security, have announced a flurry of “critical minerals partnerships” with African states – but many are still at memorandum-of-understanding stage.
For African leaders, the risk is déjà vu: another wave of extraction, new diplomatic slogans, but little structural change. UNCTAD has warned that African countries currently capture only about 40% of the potential fiscal revenues from their mineral resources, because of weak contracts, tax dodging and limited processing.
That is why civil society groups are pushing for any G20 mineral deals to be tied to strict transparency, labour and environmental safeguards, including in artisanal mining, where abuses remain widespread. In cobalt-rich Katanga, Congo’s attempt to formalise artisanal production through traceable, state-backed buying schemes is being closely watched as a test case for more ethical supply.
If the Johannesburg summit ends with only another call for “responsible sourcing”, many Africans will see it as a missed opportunity. The continent is sitting on minerals that the world cannot decarbonise without. It is also sitting on a debt burden that is crowding out health, education and climate resilience spending.
Linking the two is politically delicate but economically logical. A genuine new mineral deal would mean G20 economies accepting lower windfall profits and quicker debt relief in exchange for secure access, clearer rules and shared investment in value-addition. It would also require African governments to improve governance, cut corruption and channel mineral revenues into diversification rather than patronage.
For now, the question hanging over Johannesburg is simple: will the G20 treat Africa’s minerals as just another commodity, or as the basis for a different kind of partnership?
